The optimum allocation of airstrikes against a transportation network for an exponential damage function. by Nugent, Richard Oliver
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1969
The optimum allocation of airstrikes against a
transportation network for an exponential damage function.
Nugent, Richard Oliver





THE OPTIMUM ALLOCATION OF AIR-
STRIKES AGAINST A TRANSPORTATION













THE OPTIMUM ALLOCATION OF AIRSTRIKES






Tkii document ha* btzn appJuovzd ^on. public Kt-






The Optimum Allocation of Airstrikes Against a Transportation Network
for
an Exponential Damage Function
by
Richard Oliver Nugent
Major, United States Army
B.A., University of New Hampshire, 1959
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






A procedure is presented for solving the problem of allocating air-
strikes for the interdiction of a transportation network when the flow of
supplies is limited by the capacity of the system. The damage function is
assumed to be exponential.
The inputs required are the upper and lower bounds on the capacity of
each arc, the vulnerability of the arc to attack and the number of air-
craft sorties available for the mission. The procedure determines the
segments in the network to attack as well as the level of attack to re-
duce the network flow capacity to a minimum.
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TABLE OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
(i,j) an arc between nodes i and j
U.. maximum length (capacity in the primal) of arc (i,j)
L. . a lower bound on the length (capacity) of arc (i,j)
' J
W.. the vulnerable length (capacity)
k. . the number of sorties allocated to arc (i,j), k..
K the resource constraint, or total units of effort
available
b. . a measure of the vulnerability of arc (i,j), or a
1J measure of the efficiency of the weapon system used to
attack arc (i ,j)
s.. the surviving portion of the vulnerable length
m. . the resulting length of arc (i,j) when k. . sorties are
1J allocated. 1J
n the total number of arcs in a route from source to sink
N the total number of nodes in the network; the sink
x. . actual flow in arc (i,j) in the primal
u the Lagrange multiplier
h(u) (1/b..) ln(W..bf ./u)
W. b u 1J 1J 1J
ij ij
u* the value of u such that h(u) = k
•i"h
v the q largest value of W 4 *b*< on a route
M the minimum feasible length of the route being considered
c. . proportional damage parameter





In order to conduct sustained military operations any distance from
its permanent base a military force must have some means of resupply.
Quite often a major portion of this resupply comes over the land trans-
portation system. This is particularly the case when the opposing forces
may have air and/or sea supremacy or the means of resupply by sea or air
are not available.
The ability of the military force to operate at various levels of
combat performance may be seriously affected by the capability of the
transportation system to carry the necessary supplies. Limitations on
the cargo-carrying capacity of the transportation network may occur as
the result of the characteristics of the road network and vehicles being
used. This capacity, expressable in terms of tons per day, measures the
ability of communications lines to transport cargo.
The type and amount of supplies required to sustain a military force
vary greatly depending on the type of warfare being conducted as well as
the level of combat. Small guerrilla forces do not require as much as
larger conventional forces and may be able to provide much of their own
support from the area they are working in. In general however there are
military supplies which must be brought in. Logistics planning must
consider the supply capacities of roads and transportations requirements
to support a military operation.
The Army Field Manual for Staff Officers on Organization, Technical
and Logistical Data [1] lists and describes planning factors for the logis-
tical support of various size forces in different types of environment.
The requirements to support operations in various situations are ex-
pressed in terms of pounds-per-man-per-day and include all classes of
supply.
Hoi li day [2] has provided the research allowing the concept of net-
work capacity to be applied to highways- In work done for the Advanced
Research Projects Agency, he provides the methodology for determining
road capacities. He analyzes traffic cargo flow based on operational
factors and relates the road supply capacity to the number of vehicles
required to achieve that capacity.
B. INTERDICTION
When the resuoply capability of one force is limited by the capacity
of the transportation network over which it must operate, it is to the
advantage of the opposing force to consider the interdiction of that net-
work. It may be worthwhile diverting resources toward network interdic-
tion in order to further reduce the capacity of the transportation system.
By restricting the capacity, the flow of goods is ultimately restricted.
This is taken as the objective rather than minimizing flow directly.
Moving vehicles become difficult to interdict when provided with suffi-
cient defense, jungle canopy, camouflage or cover of darkness. In
addition, destroying vehicles with cargo may not accomplish the desired
objective unless either vehicles or supplies are in short supply.
Airstrikes may be used to further restrict the capacities of segments
in the network. This may be done by destroying bridges, ferries or rail-
road track, cratering or blocking roads, et cetera. In addition, aircraft
may reduce the capacity flow of traffic over a network by reducing the
period during which vehicles may operate.
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Several authors have considered the supply network interdiction
problem. Wollmer [3,4] determines the most vital links of a network and
examines the effect on capacity of removing the most vital link from the
network. Arcs are subject to breakdown which results in a decrease in
capacity (1) by a known quantity and then (2) by a quantity which is a
I 4-
random variable. He finds the greatest reduction of flow possible if
n breakdowns occur and where these must occur. No consideration is made
for the cost of the breakdown which, in the case of interdiction, corre-
sponds to the number of aircraft allocated. In addition his method
appears cumbersome when there may be more than a few breakdowns per arc.
Durbin [5] evaluates the ability of a transportation network to
deliver supplies as the road segments are successively destroyed and
repaired. The methodology is provided for successively removing the next
most vital arc until the flow is reduced to zero or the pre-determined
number of links have been destroyed. The process then steps to the next
day, restores repaired links and continues. He too uses lower bounds of
zero and does not consider the cost to destroy the link.
The effectiveness of airstrikes against a segment of the network may
be a function of many factors. The type of weapon system involved, its
accuracy and destructiveness , characteristics of the segment such as
overhead cover and concealment, defense, vulnerability and recoverability
are all examples of such factors.
Mustin [6] has looked at the interdiction problem when the decrease
in capacity of an arc has a fixed deterministic rate and is known; the
reduction in capacity is assumed linear between upper and lower bounds
with the latter being positive. He proposes a linear approximation when
the returns are not constant.
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Generally airstrikes can be expected to reduce the capacity of a seq-
ment of the network according to some sort of law of decreasing marginal
returns. This is reasonable when it is considered that although a bridge
may be destroyed, it may still be possible to ford or ferry supplies
across a river. Similarly shuttling may be conducted to overcome the
effect of cratered or blocked roads.
This paper therefore considers a damage function which exhibits
decreasing marqinal returns throughout; namely, an exponential function.
C. ALLOCATION
The aeneral interdiction problem facing the strike planner on a
given day is which segments of the network to attack and at what level.
His objective is to create the maximum reduction in flow capacity in
order to have the greatest effect on the opposing side's combat perform-
ance. The restriction placed upon him is the number of sorties available.
To accomplish his objective the strike planner must make the most
efficient utilization of the resources available to him. He must consider
not only the capacity of each segment of the network but also its vulner-
ability and importance. An arc with the largest capacity is not necessarily
the most worthwhile target, nor is an arc with the highest vulnerability.
It is assumed that the strike planner has available to him the neces-
sary information concerning the factors involved. He knows the upper and
lower bounds on capacity of each segment and its vulnerability. The number
of sorties available to him is fixed. His problem is how to allocate those
sorties in order to have the greatest effect on the enemy's resupply capa-
bility.
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II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this paper is to present a method of solving the
problem of allocation of effort in the interdiction of a transportation
network for a damage function having decreasing marginal returns.
The strike planner is assumed to have available to him information
regarding the upper and lower bounds of segment capacities. It is also
assumed that he knows the vulnerabilities of each segment. Finally, the
total number of sorties available is assumed known and fixed. A necessary
assumption is that the various segments are independent in so far as the
reduction of capacity of one arc does not affect the vulnerability of
another arc. The proportional reduction in capacity of arc (i,j) with
k . • sorties is assumed to be 1 - exp(-b. .k. .).
The solution procedure selects the segments to be attacked which will
give the smallest resulting value of maximum capacity and the number of
sorties to allocate to each segment. Also given in the results is the




The transportation system can be represented by a network of arcs
and nodes. Nodes represent intersections of road segments. Further,
they may be used to represent any point at which it is convenient to
distinguish between the road characteristics on either side of the node.
Arcs represent road segments. Each arc joins two nodes. Associated
with each arc are quantities representing the upper and lower bounds on
capacity and the vulnerability of the arc. Both upper and lower bounds
are in terms of the maximum amount of flow which may pass over the arc
in a unit of time, say in tons per day.
Two special nodes are the source and sink. It is assumed that all
goods flow from the source to the sink. If there are several sources
or sinks, this may be taken care of by adding artificial nodes and arcs.
The capacities of these artificial arcs are infinite and they are not
vulnerable to attack.
The notation (i,j) represents the arc between nodes i and j, Nodes
are numbered from 1 to N with 1 the source and N the sink. The inter-
mediate nodes have any of the values between 1 and N. For a particular
route, n will represent the total number of arcs in the route.
The actual flow in an arc (i,j) is designated as x. . if it is flowing
from i to j and as x if it is flowing from j to i , Flow is assumed
to be from the source to the sink but may be in either direction over the
intermediate arcs and nodes. Due to the undirected structure of the
network considered, capacities on arcs' represent bounds on net flow over
the arcs in either direction.
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The principle of flow conservation at the nodes is assumed. This
means that flow out of a node equals flow into a node; that is, there is
no storage at nodes.
The capacity on arc (i,j) at any time is represented by m. . and
impl ies
< x . . < m . .
.
- iJ - iJ
As long as the capacity of an arc is the same in both directions, m. .
= m... This will be the nature of network arcs considered.
The lettering U. . and L.. represent the upper and lower bounds
respectively on the capacity of the arc (i,j). If there is no lower
bound then L . . = 0. The following relationship holds:
The vulnerability of arc (i,j) is represented by the parameter b...
This vulnerability parameter indicates the efficiency of the particular
weapon system against the arc.
The amount of capacity of arc (i,j) which is vulnerable to attack
is W.
.
= U. • - L. • . As the expected proportion of reduction is
'J 'J I J
1 - exp (-b. .k..)» the reduction function which results is then
WijL l - expf-b.jk.j)]
W. . would be the expected reduction in capacity for a very high
effort; t'nat is, for k. . = » . Only by allocating an infinite (or very
high amount of) effort toward arc (i,j) would the expected resulting
capacity be its lower bound.
For
-.finite k.. the remaining capacity of arc (i,j) is given by:
i J
m . . .
Ufl
- Wlj [l - exp (-b^k..] .
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B. MAXIMAL FLOW DETERMINATION
It is assumed that the opposing force wishes to maximize the total
flow, Q, through the transportation network available. This is the
standard maximal flow problem which can be stated as the following
linear programming problem:






subject to i Xji, - 2 x.. = i = 2,3,..,, N-l
<_ x. . <.m.
.
i = 1 ,2,. . - ,N
j = 1 ,2,.., ,N i>j
where m. = if the particular arc (i,j) does not exist; otherwise m. .
is a known constant. The notation x.. represents the flow from node i




The maximal flow can be determined by use of the maximal-flow
minimal-cut theorem [7]. A cut set, defined as a set of arcs which
separates the source from the sink, has a value defined as the sum of
the capacities of all arcs* in the cut set. The maximal-flow minimal-cut
theorem states that the maximal flow in a network is equal to the minimal
value of al 1 cut sets,
It is convenient to use the notion of a topological dual in finding
the cut set through a network [8]. The topological dual will be a net-
work where arcs have lengths instead of capacities. There is a one-to-
one correspondence between the cuts of the original network and the
routes through the dual. The shortest route through the dual corresponds
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to the minimal cut set in the original or primal network; its length is
equal to the value of the minimal-cut set. The topological dual is
defined only for planar networks, that is, for a network where no two
arcs intersect except at a node when the network is represented on a
plane. This will be the only type of network considered in this paper.
To form the dual, an additional arc is drawn to connect the source
and sink of the primal. This forms the modified primal, G. The dual
of the primal is constructed by taking a vertex inside each region of
G and one vertex outside G and connecting vertices in adjacent regions
with arcs which cross arcs of the primal. The vertices are points which
become the nodes of the dual . Only one arc can cross an arc of the primal
and no arc crosses the artificial arc. Select as the source or sink the
node outside G and then designate the node in the region created by the
artificial arc of G as the other end of the network.
The lengths of the arcs in the dual are the capacities of the arcs
which they intersect in the primal. Because the primal network is un-
directed, the arcs of the dual are also undirected. The maximal flow
through the primal can therefore be determined by finding the shortest
route through the dual. The shortest route is found by finding the path
from source to sink such that the summation of arc lengths in the path
is minimum among all possible paths from source to sink.
C. THE INTERDICTION PROBLEM
The interdiction problem associated with the dual involves deter-
mining the feasible distribution of effort over a route which will result
in reducing its total length by the largest amount. The improvability of
the arc in the dual is the same as the vulnerability of the primal arc.
Each unit of effort (each sortie) allocated toward an arc in the dual
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shortens the length of that arc resulting in the reduction of the asso-
ciated arc capacity in the primal arc. Some route through the dual will
have the shortest length after optimal allocation. The problem is to
find this "shortest" route and determine the optimal allocation to attain
its final length. Mathematically, the problem is to find that route
which
minimizes z {U. . - W. . [1 - exp(-b..k. .)]}
j «S 'J 'J ' J • J
subject to z k. . < K , k. . >
i,j 1J - 1J
-
In the equations above and throughout this paper, the notation
z is taken to mean the summation over all arcs in the particular
i»j
route.
The restraint of the problem above can be considered an equality as
the objective function is continuous and decreasing for finite K; that
is, the value of the objective function for any number of sorties less





By utilizing the topological dual, the problem of allocation
becomes one of determining the shortest feasible route through the dual
In finding the solution, there are three separate problems which must
be dealt with:
1) which route through the dual to select;
2) which arcs in the route to attack;
3) how much effort to allocate to each of the attacked arcs.
The amount of computations is reduced by establishing upper and lower
bounds on the feasible lengths for each route, thereby eliminating some
routes from further consideration.
Although an integer solution is not provided in the calculations of
the procedure, the value of the objective function obtained in the
example problem was not changed greatly by using a simple round-off proce-
dure. This is generally true due to the nature of the exponential
distribution. In the event that the parameters are such as to be working
on the steep slope portion of the exponential curve, it may be necessary
to investigate the integer solutions.
B. ALLOCATION OF STRIKE EFFORT TO A GIVEN ROUTE
In approaching the problem, it is useful to consider a problem pro-
posed by Koopman [9] and explained in more detail by Danskin [10].
Consider first the following lemma by Gibbs as given by Danskin:
Suppose the set x° = (x-, ,x
2
°,.
. . ,x °) maximizes r. ^-j( x ^)
subject to the conditions l x. = X, x. >_ 0. Suppose further the
f. are differentiate. Then there exists a scalar u, such that
19




) = u if x. ;
u if x. = ;




For the allocation of effort toward interdiction the f. of Gibbs
'
lemma is W. [1 - exp(-b. .k. .)]. From the conditions of the lemma, the
•J ' J ' J
following relations must be satisfied for an optimal allocation on a
route:
Wi .b.. expt-b.jk..) -u if k i;j ; (1)
Vij - u if k ij =0 ( 2 )
It will be desirable to show that (1) and (2) are necessary and
sufficient conditions. Suppose W..b.. <_ u and k.. > 0, then (1) must
hold. Because exp(-b..k. .) is always less than 1 for b.. and k.. both
positive, then W. .b. . > u, which is a contradiction of the original
assumptions. Therefore k. . 0. But k.. ^ is required for feasibility,
J - iJ
J~ij "ij
Thus W..b.. < u implies k.. =0. This together with (2) implies
W. .b. • < u if and only if k. . = . (3)
ij ij - iJ
The feasibility requirement together with (3) indicates that W..b..
l J i J
> u implies k.. > as k.. = can only happen if W. .b. . <_ u.
The value of k... where k. . > 0, may be derived from (1):
ij ij J
k. . = (1/b. .) ln(W. .b. ./u) (4)
ij ij ij ij
where u must satisfy
H;-b.. (Vb id ) ln(W b /u) = K
IJ U u J J J
The summation sign in the above relation is taken as the summation over
all arcs in the route with W. b.. greater than u.U iJ y
20
To determine the value of u, first define h(u) and v as follows:
q
h(u) = E (1/b ••) ln(W.,b,,/u)
W. .b. . > u 1J 1J 1J
ij IJ
E (1/b ) ln(W b ••) - ln(u) E (1/b..)
W..b. . > u 1J 1J 1J W. .b.. > u 1J
v = W b = the q-th largest value of W. .b. . in the route.
q q q u ij
The desired value u* is that value of u which satisfies h(u) = K.
It is helnful to look at the nature of the function h(u). For
u small {near zero), h(u) is larqe and for u sufficiently small, h(u)
is laraer than any finite K. For u qreater than or equal to v, (the
maximum value of W. .b. . on that route), h(u) is equal to zero. For u
between and v, , h(u) is strictly decreasinq and continuous.
To find u, the followinq recursive formula is developed for h(v ),
where v < v < v,
:
n — q — 1
q-1
h(vj = h(v
n J + [ln(vn J - ln(vj] i (1/b.)
q-2 q-2
where h(v ,) = z O/b.) Ib^) - ln(v -) z (1/b.) .
i=1 ' H ' 1=1
Specifically,
*




W . . > u
= E (1/b.) ln(W.b,/u ). (5)
i=l ]
] ]
The sinqle subscript on the b's indicates the b corresponding to the
v which is the q-th largest value of W..b...
q iJ ij
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In the event K < h(v ), h(v ) is successively computed for q = n,
n-l,...,l , that is, from the smallest to the largest value of v , until
H
h(v ) > K > h(v ,)v
0/ — K q-1 '






,)]/ i (1/b.)} .
q -
1
q - 1 . _
-J
i
If h(v ) = K, then u = v .
The value of k. ., the amount of effort to allocate for an arc
•k




When W. .b. . < u , k. . = 0, as determined in the derivation.
It remains to determine which route in a network to select in order
to get the minimum feasible route through the network. Letting
M* = i {[). . - W. .[1 - exp(-b. .k. .)]}
1 >J
*
for a particular route after the k.. have been determined, the problem
*
is to find that route for which M is minimum over all possible routes.
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For this a stepwise procedure is developed to eliminate some of the
routes from consideration by means of establishing bounds on the feasible
route lengths.
For the special case of L... = 0, a simplification results because
W.. U. .. The criterion for attack of arc (i,j) is that U..b.. is
greater than u . This can be handled by direct substitution and
presents no problem in the computations.
C. STEPWISE PROCEDURE
1) Determine the minimum normal route using the upper bounds on
lengths, U. .. This may be done using any of the shortest route algorithms
[11]. The route through the network is found such that the sum of the
upper bounds is the minimum over all routes. This then becomes the first
least upper bound for the network.
2) Determine the r-shortest routes through the network using the
lower bounds on capacities, where r is the number of distinct routes in
the network from source to sink without loops.
Because of the nature of the problem it is not necessary to
consider any route with a lower bound greater than the least upper bound.
In general, therefore, the number of routes that have to be considered
will be considerably less than the total number of distinct routes in the
network. In addition, there is no practical reason for passing over an
arc or node more than once because, in determining a minimum cut set, if
M is the length of a feasible route without loops, any route considering
loops would have a length greater than M and need not be considered.
Therefore if some computational procedure is used to determine the r-th
shortest route, caution must be taken that no arc or node is included twice
in any route. Clarke, Krikorian and Rausen [12] provide a procedure for
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determining the N best loopless paths in a network where N is any
positive integer.
3) Beginning with the route having the smallest bound, determine
improved bounds by computing h(v ) from equation (5).
4) As h(v ) is a continuous and decreasing function, if K is
greater than h(v ), this means that u is less than v and all k. . are
positive. The surviving portion of the vulnerable capacity is





and the feasible minimum length for the route is
M* = I L.. •+ u* z 1/b.. .
I.j 1J i,j 1J
The value of u can now be computed in closed form and the value of the
feasible minimum length for the route obtained. The equation for com-
puting u is
u* = v exp {-[K - h(v )]/ z (1/b..)}
5) If K is less than or equal to h(v ), then u is greater than or


















"^i'i (1/b..) = M*
This bound can prove useful in the following manner: if any route has
a minimum feasible length or lower bound which is greater than the least
upper bound for the network, this route can be eliminated from further
consideration.
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6) If any feasible route length is less than the least upper bound
for the network, this becomes the new network least upper bound.
7) Only those routes with lower bounds less than or equal to the
least upper bound of the network need be considered further.
8) To continue, it is now necessary to perform the summations over
*
the arcs which have W..b.. greater than u for those routes for which
•
u and the minimum feasible length have not yet been determined. Begin-
ning with the route having the next larger lower bound, order the v






= the q- th largest value of W..b.. in that route;






i f* Vij >
v = W b = min W. .b. . .
n n n . . ij ij
1
» j
Summations are henceforth made over the single subscript. Successively
compute h(v ) for q = n,n-l,...,l for the route being considered until
h(v ) >_ K > h(v , ) for some q 1 < q < n .
9) At each iterative computation, if it is found that h(v ) > K,
a new improved lower bound is provided as this means another arc has
*
been found for which no sorties will be allocated and that u > v .
q
This means the feasible route length will not be as great as if u = v
,
that is,
n q-1 q-1 *
L.B. = z U. + W b I (1/b.) + E L. M . (7)
i=q 1 " i = l
'
i=l ' ~
If the lower bound for a route exceeds the current least upper
bound for the network at any time, this route may be dropDed from further
consideration.
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10) Once the value of q is found so that both h(v ) > K and
q —
K > h(v ,), the improved lower bound is found as in (7), and the least
upper bound for the route is
n q-1 q-1




1 ^ <H 1=1
U.B. q^ q^ (1/b.) M . (8)




implies that u is less than v ,
.
q-1
11) The minimum feasible route length can now be derived for the
route being considered:










, exp{ -[K - h(v ,)]/ z (1/b.) }.
12) The process is repeated from step 6 until all routes have been
considered. The route with the minimum feasible route length over all
routes in the network is the one to allocate airstrikes to. Ties indi-
cate that there are two or more minimum feasible cut sets in the primal.
13) Having selected the route which produces the minimum feasible
distance through the network and the u for that route, the remainder of
the solution is available. Those arcs with W..b.. qreater than u will
*
be attacked and the level of attack on arc (i,j) will be k. . fromU
equation (6).
D. EXAMPLE
The following is a hypothetical example of a transportation network.
The first diagram in figure 1 is the primal network. Flow is from node





Figure 1. An Example Network
There are three numbers associated with each arc: U. ., L. • and b...
These represent the upper and lower bounds and the vulnerability para-
meter, respectively, of each arc. The number of sorties available for
the interdiction of the network is 40.
In figure 2 the topological dual is formed by first constructing the
artificial arc between the source and the sink. Asterisks are used to





Figure 2. Construction of the Dual
Figure 3 shows the topological dual with the appropriate figures
transferred from the primal. For convenience of reference the various









































Figure 3. The Topological Dual
The minimum length normal route is provided by R, with a length of
2130. This becomes the first least upper bound for the network.
In determining the r shortest routes using the lower bounds, the














The lower bound on the next shortest route is from R-,; it is 2250 which
exceeds the present least upper bound. For this reason it is not neces-




Computations are begun on the routes in increasing order of lower
bounds. When a feasible minimum length is found which is lower than the
lower bound of the remaining routes, the optimum solution has been found,
No other route can be reduced to this amount.




= 0.1(100) = 10; v
2
= 0.07(130) = 9.1;V
3
= 0.08(100) = 8;
v
4
= 0.06(50) = 3; v
g
= 0.01(170) = 1.7 .
The function h(v
5
) is computed, and it found that the number of
sorties available is less than h(v
5
) = 70.51. Similarly it is found
that K = 40 is less than h(v
4
) = 40.15, but K is greater than h(v
3 )
= 4.07. This indicates that arcs (1,2), (11,14) and (8,11) would be
attacked while arcs (2,5) and (5,8) would have no sorties allocated.
A first improved lower bound is obtained by adding the sum of the upper
bounds of those arcs which would not be attacked and the sum of the
lower bounds of those arcs which would be attacked if this route were
chosen.
5 3





A second improved lower bound is obtained using equation (7)
5 3 3





= 1800 + 3(36.79) = 1910.37
From (8) an upper bound for R, is
5 3 3
U.B. = i U. + z L. + v. z (1/b.)
i=4 ] i=l n 6 1-1 n
= 1800 + 8(36.79) = 2094.32
This becomes the new least upper bound for the network and replaces the
figure 2130 previously derived.
The minimum feasible length for R, is
* 5 3 * 3






where u is the solution to h(u) = K,
u* = v~ exp [ - (40 - 4.0719)/36.7857] = 3.0125 .
Therefore
M* = 850+950+3.01(36.79) = 1910.74.
This is less than the current least upper bound and therefore becomes
the new least upper bound for the network. R
?
may now be eliminated from
further consideration as it has a current lower bound of 1920. Only R_
,
IL and Rr remain for consideration.







M* = 1902.14 .
R. is therefore better than R, . Only R
3
and R,. remain for consideration
as possible best routes. Computations for Rj. result in finding an
improved lower bound of 1936 and R
5
can be eliminated. Similarly the
improved lower bound for R
3
is 2159 and R~ need not be considered further,
R- is therefore the best route. The non-integer solution for the number

































which results in a feasible length of 1902.21 . This is better than the
non-integer solution of the closest contender, R, .
Returning to the primal, the cut set to be attacked is as shown in
figure 4.




The procedure described ends in a finite number of steps as the
routes are systematically eliminated by means of upper and lower bounds,
after which the worst possibility is complete enumeration for the re-
maining routes.
A non-integer solution is produced. If the parameters and the
resource constraint are such as to be on the steep slope portion of the
curve for the objective function, the integer solution may be vastly
different than the non-integer solution. As the improved bounds in the
procedure are for the feasible non-integer solution, it may be that the
integer solution will actually be outside the non-integer bounds. If,
however, the problem is such as to be on a less steep portion of the
curve, the integer and non-integer solutions may s/ary only slightly.
In this case a simple round-off procedure might be used to get an integer
solution without much difference with the correct optimal integer solution,
It appears that the only method to derive the optimal integer solution is
by investigation around the non-integer solution.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions that the values of maximum capacity, vulnerable
proportions, lower bounds and vulnerability factors are known and deter-
ministic is difficult to justify. Experimental testing such as that
suggested by Holliday [13] might be used to determine whether the exponen-
tial distribution could validly be used as a damage function. It would
then be necessary to determine the probability of a target hit and the
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proportion of capacity reduction done by a sequence of target hits under
various conditions of road types, concealment, weather and other charac-
teristics as might be judged important.
C. INTERPRETATION OF THE LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER
The Lagrange multiplier u has an interesting interpretation and
consequent use. It is the differential rate of damage for an additional
sortie. In this sense, it can be interpreted as the implicit marginal
price which a commander is placing on the expected destruction of one
more unit of network capacity when he limits the number of sorties avail-
able for network interdiction. Another manner in which it might be used
is when a commander decides he will allocate strikes up to the point
where he starts getting less than u Units of capacity reduction for each
strike. In this sense he is making a trade-off with the other alterna-
tives available to him. He allocates aircraft to tactical interdiction
up to the point where the marginal return is in some sense the same as
that of an additional aircraft allocated to any other mission.
The solution to such a problem can be derived by using the given
value of u in the formulae as the criterion for attack. Those arcs with
W..b.. qreater than u would be attacked at the level k.. where k.. is
*
determined from equation (6) using the given value of u as u .
D. ANOTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR USE OF THE EXPONENTIAL FUNCTION
Koopman [9] gives an interpretation of optimum destructiveness and
makes a comparison with search theory wherein he gives some justification
for the use of the exponential as a damage function. He points out the
problem of optimum distribution of gunfire, bombs or other destructive
missiles projected into an area. His presentation will be paraphrased
in terms of optimum allocation between arcs of a route.
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Two arcs with maximum lengths (capacities in the primal) of U, and
U
?
have proportional vulnerable lengths of W,/U, and W
?
/IL respectively.
Because of the type of bombing used, defenses, overhead cover or what-
ever, the bombing will be sufficiently accurate to hit the particular
arc but not to hit the vulnerable capacity in the area except by chance.
The vulnerability of all capacity is assumed to be the same on a partic-
ular arc. The result of n random hits on the target area W.,i=l,2, is
assumed to reduce the vulnerable capacity by a proportion 1 - c where
C is less than 1. Thus after n hits on the vulnerable capacity the
total capacity of the arc would be reduced to U. -W.+c.W. , the
reduction being W. - c W. and the proportionate reduction
i in
Pj - c.\.)/W. .
If there are N bombs available and no cost difference exists between
dropping bombs on one arc than the other, then the decision as to how to
allocate bombs between the two arcs is properly made on the basis of
maximizing the expected damage to be inflicted.





= N and N
]
^ , N 2
>_ .
The probability that one bomb dropped on the first arc will hit the
target is W-./U-]
,
assuming that the vulnerable capacity is uniformly
distributed. (It is also possible to use as the probability of hit, p.,
instead of the ratio W./ll. .) If N-, bombs are dropped on arc 1, the




The proportional damage done by the R, hits being 1 - c, 1 , the expected
proportional damage produced by N, bombs dropped on arc 1 is given by





= - ln[l - 1^(1 - c^/l^] .
9
Thus the expected proportional damage is 1 - exp(-b.N.) . The
expected reduction in capacity over the route when N, bombs are dropped
on arc 1 and N« bombs are dropped on arc 2 is
W^l - exp (-b^)] + W
2
[l - exp (-b^)] . (9)
The resulting expected capacity is
U
]



















Similar results are obtained by either maximizing (9) or minimizing
either (10) or (11) subject to the restrictions that N, + N« = N and
N
l
1 0, N 2 >_ .
The bomb allocation problem is therefore to find the bombing strategy
which gives the minimum expected value of the minimum feasible cut set
through the flow network.
E. APPLICATIONS
Due to the particular characteristics of the transportation networks
used in most of the land masses in Southeast Asia, the proposed procedure
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miqht be quite appropriate for use in the interdiction problem in such
areas. The fact that large portions of roadways in that area of the
world are under a jungle canopy or can be easily provided with artificial
concealment makes it difficult to obtain accurate bomb hits. This situ-
ation lends itself to a probabilistic treatment.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
An analysis of actual strike data is appropriate before the exponen-
tial damage function can be considered for real-world use. Research such
as that done by Holliday for ARPA [2,13] might provide such data. It
would be desirable to determine hit probabilities and the expected
reduction in capacity resulting from a sequence of hits by various weapon
systems.
The exponential function is particularly easy to use because it
provides numerous simplifications to the computational problem. Gibbs'
lemma however applies to any continuous differential function with
decreasing marginal returns. The data might suggest that the exponential
is inappropriate but that some other function having such marginal
returns can be used.
On the surface there appears to be some optimal criterion for the
rounding-off of the non-integer solution. The branch-and-bound method
does not seem to lend itself to a simple application in this case.
As with many other treatments involving allocation, this paper was
unable to deal with the cost of lost aircraft. In a way, this was taken
care of in the vulnerability parameters of the various arcs. If the
probability of getting through the defenses is 3/4 and the probability of
a target hit is 1/3 for those aircraft getting through the defenses, then
37
the probability of a target hit by a sortie allocated can be expressed
in terms of conditional probability as
1/3 X 3/4 1/4 .
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VI. SUMMARY
A procedure has been presented for computing the optimum allocation
of aircraft sorties toward the tactical interdiction of a transportation
network when the flow of supplies is restricted by the capacity of the
network. A specific damage function is assumed which requires knowledge
or estimates of the upper and lower bounds of capacities as well as the
vulnerability of each arc to the weapon system involved.
The method utilizes the notion of the topological dual and finds the
minimum feasible route through the dual. The total length of this route
corresponds to the minimum value to which the capacity of the network
can be reduced given the number of sorties available.
The alternative routes through the dual are first screened systemati-
cally by means of bounding the minimum feasible length. The stepwise
procedure eliminates those routes from consideration which cannot meet
the first least upper bound. The Lagrange multiplier is used as a thresh-
hold criterion based on the product of the parameters W. . and b. . to
determine whether an arc should be hit. The number of sorties to allocate
to the arc is then determined. The routes are considered in increasing
order of sums of lower bounds. Once a feasible length or least upper
bound is found less than the next lower bound, all other routes may be
eliminated from consideration. The route with the minimum feasible length
is the best route and corresponds to the minimum cut set in the primal.
In order to begin the stepwise procedure the inputs required are the
upper and lower bounds on arc capacity, the vulnerability of each arc, and
the total number of sorties available for interdiction of the network. The
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